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Abstract
‘Structural realism’ is a buzzword in the scientific realism debate. Vari-
ous positions with diverse motivations fall under this label. A much adver-
tised distinction is between epistemic and ontological forms of structural-
ism. This paper scrutinizes the alleged dichotomy between these two ‘alter-
natives’, and criticises the considerations that have been taken to motivate
the ontic variety over the epistemic. I will argue that ontological structural
realism is not called for within the traditional realism debate.
1 Introduction
‘Structural realism’ is a buzzword in the realism debate. Like bees buzzing after
honeydew, thinkers are drawn to the flourishing variety of structuralism in the field
of philosophy of science. The frantic activity has resulted in dozens of publica-
tions and, perhaps quite unavoidably, much ambiguity in what structural realism
actually is, and what ultimately motivates it. The blossoming variety of different
conceptions calls for some clarificatory work.
There’s a much advertised distinction between epistemic and ontological vari-
eties of structural realism. ‘Ontic’ Structural Realism (OSR) is motivated by con-
siderations from the foundations of physics, and it is characterised as metaphysics.
Epistemic Structural Realism (ESR), by contrast, represents a ‘mere’ epistemo-
logical refinement to ‘standard’ realism. This paper focuses on the motivations of
OSR, and especially on the claim that in moving from standard realism to struc-
tural realism one should not stop before one arrives at the rather radical position of
OSR. I claim that the advocates of OSR have failed to motivate it as an alternative
to ESR and other ‘non-standard’ forms of realism. Although there’s incentive to
move away from object-oriented standard realism, there’s no need to go as far as
OSR.
∗I wish to thank Steven French and Angelo Cei for helpful correspondence.
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Section 3 scrutinises the argument from the so-called metaphysical underde-
termination. Section 4 looks at the way in which structuralism in philosophy of
physics bears on the realism debate. Section 1 begins by making clear what ESR
is, and what motivates it.
2 What ESR is (not)
There is a natural motivation for epistemic structural realism. It is the possibility
of having ‘the best of both worlds’, as put by Worrall (1989), with regard to two
opposing arguments at the core of the realism debate. The realist wants to paint
an optimistic image of the truth content of our present theories that is plausible
in the face of our best understanding of actual science and its method, motivated
by the intuition behind the No Miracles argument, and not falsified by the history
of science (Pessimistic Induction). This requires a principled way of delineating
continuity in the truth content across radical theory shifts. ESR purports to identify
the structural content of a theory in such a way as to ensure cumulative continuity
in that kind of content.
The structuralist intuition springs from the fact that in various historical theory-
shifts there are crucial mathematical equations that are carried over either intact or,
more typically, as one set of equations being a limiting case of the other. There
are examples in which the crucial equations of the successive theories are (a) for-
mally identical, but furnished with divergent interpretations (e.g. the shift from
Fresnel’s ether theory to Maxwell’s electromagnetic theory of optics); (b) formally
equivalent apart from one or two new parameters, say, which disappear at some
well-defined mathematical limit to yield the old equation (e.g. moving from the
Galilean to the Lorentzian inhomogeneous group of transformations). The latter
(more typical) cases get arguably further support from the endorsement of Heinz
Post’s (1971) general correspondence principle according to which any acceptable
new theory should explain the well-confirmed part of its predecessor. Although
this principle can be viewed to manifest itself in actual science in a variety of ways
(Hartmann, 2002), an important dimension of Post’s well-received notion of both
descriptive and prescriptive correspondence in modern science is undeniably of the
relevant mathematico-structural kind. Worrall’s suggestion was to take the theoret-
ical continuity manifested as such formal mathematical correspondence to be the
locus of realist commitment.
This is a valid structuralist intuition. The highly mathematical nature of mod-
ern science together with the presumed descriptive soundness of the general corre-
spondence principle makes it a very promising idea, at least with respect to some
domains of science. But there remains much to be clarified to turn the intuition
into a credible argument. To begin with the most obvious, the structuralist needs
to ensure that the kind of continuity in focus really has to do with the realist rather
than empiricist content. For surely the empiricist is also bound to find a level of
continuity in the mathematical structures of a theory—namely those structures that
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encode the theory’s empirical content. (Bueno, 1999; van Fraassen 2006) The re-
alist claim is meant go further, of course, to declare a structural correspondence
in the relevant theoretical content. Hence, Poincare´ (as quoted in realist lights by
Worrall, 1989) asserts that
The differential equations [in Fresnel’s theory] are always true [that
is, they are carried over into Maxwell’s theory], they may always be
integrated by the same methods and the results of this integration still
preserve their value.
It cannot be said that this is reducing physical theories to practical
recipes; these equations express relations, and if the equations remain
true, it is because the relations preserve their reality. They teach us
now, as they did then, that there is such and such a relation between
this thing and that; only the something which we then called motion,
we now call electric [displacement] current. But these are merely the
names of the images we substituted for the real objects which Nature
will hide for ever from our eyes. The true relations between these real
objects are the only reality we can attain... (Poincare´, 1905: 161)
This is beautiful rhetoric, but what does this amount to in practise? To re-
ally see what ‘the true relations’ of Fresnel’s theory are and how they compare
with Maxwell’s theory, one needs to engage in some history of science. (Saatsi,
2005) Worrall (1989, 1994) simply cites Fresnel’s equations for the amplitudes of
reflected and refracted polarized light, to point out that they are truly identical to
those resulting from Maxwell’s theory. But this is not enough. The motivation for
going beyond empiricist commitments—the No Miracles argument—entails that
we should be able to explain the success of the predecessor theory from the vantage
point of the successor, in terms of truth-tracking theoretical content. This surely de-
mands more than pointing out that the equations the two theories ultimately yield—
the equations that are used to test the theory against the experiment—are equiva-
lent or stand in some limit-correspondence. What it demands, rather, is that we
can account for the derivation of Fresnel’s equation in terms of Maxwell’s theory.
For not only is there much to Fresnel’s theorising besides ‘the Fresnel equations’
which represent the very end result of his theorising, but we also recall that the
plausibility of the realist image, structural or otherwise, comes in part from fulfill-
ing the intuition that success of a theory is connected to its approximate truth in
a ‘non-miraculous’ fashion. This means that we should really be considering the
relationship between the derivations by which the corresponding equations are ar-
rived at in the first place, and it is not clear that this relationship is best understood
in structural terms. (Cf. Saatsi 2005, 2008)
Another point to press the epistemic structural realist on concerns the sense in
which one structure can be said to approximate another. Mere appeal to the general
correspondence principle leaves this too open. The worry is that without a precise
sense in which one structure corresponds to another we end up finding mathe-
matical continuity where we want it. Even in the cases of intuitively appealing
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limit-correspondence we often have grave mathematical discontinuities that mark
the theoretical revolution, as Redhead reminds us:
Consider the case of classical neo-Newtonian spacetime being replaced
by the Minkowski spacetime of special relativity. We can consider a
family of structures {SC} corresponding to varying the velocity of
light c. For all finite c we can argue that the structure is stable with
respect to changing c, but at c = ∞ there is a qualitative singularity in
the sense that the metric of spacetime becomes singular in this limit.
The existence of qualitative singularities of this type is also apparent
in the case of the family of quantum mechanical structures indexed by
a variable Plank’s constant h¯. (2001: 346)
Such discontinuities in the evolution of theoretical structures can perhaps be dis-
missed on the grounds that they are immaterial to the explanation of the success
of the antecedent theory from the later perspective, but such claims need to be
made on case-by-case basis and only after carefully scrutinising the nature of the
particular structural (dis-)continuity in question.
In general it is quite clear that declarations of structural continuity cannot solely
refer to mathematical equations, for we must (of course) somehow express the fact
that the theories featuring these equations have the same subject matter. Formally
equivalent equations are used for various purposes in different domains of sci-
ence and any application of the correspondence principle needs to say something
about how the equations in question are comparable apart from the shared logico-
syntactic form. That is, we need to focus on interpreted equations. In some cases it
is very straightforward to relate the equations to the same observable phenomenon
(e.g. the Fresnel-Maxwell case), but we should ask whether there is a principled
and preferred way of making the comparison. Is there a principled (logical) way of
teasing out the structural content? In particular, do theories have to be regimented
in some way for the comparison to be justified? For example, within the syntactic-
axiomatic framework the prima facie possibility of using Ramsey sentences arises:
these leave only mathematico-logical structure to supplement the content express-
ible with the terms left outside of the Ramsey-elimination. But arguably there are
various reasons for preferring the alternative semantic framework of theories, and
it turns out that this framework lends itself to a very different structuralist reading.
All in all, the thesis of ESR needs sharpening. Nevertheless, the epistemo-
logical motivation for structural realism is valid. The project of first making the
structuralist proposal more precise and then comparing it to various instances of
historical theory change is well-defined and intuitively cogent one. But it has been
recently misinterpreted by some of the advocates of the alternative OSR. The key
issue hinges on the proper interpretation of the epistemic humility of ESR. Let’s
take a typical statement of Worrall’s realist position:
According to Worrall’s [Epistemic Structural Realism] all that we know
of the world is its structure, as exemplified in our scientific theories,
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and the ‘nature’ of the underlying elements (physical objects) remains
‘hidden’ in some sense. (Cei and French, 2006: 634)
The present question concerns the sense in which the nature of reality remains
hidden in ESR. Cei and French (2006) offer an interpretation of Worrall’s ‘hidden
natures’. They propose that we might equate this epistemic humility with the kind
of Ramseyan Humility that David Lewis (forthcoming) has advocated, and they
find the consequences of this equation problematic for the epistemic structuralist.
The suggestion, then, is that a cost of adopting the Lewisian picture
would be increased pressure to locate the distinction between struc-
ture and nature with the latter and hence the necessity of facing up to
French and Ladyman’s arguments. (ibid., 652)
There is no need to explore in detail the kind of epistemic humility that arises in
Lewis’s metaphysics by virtue of combining a combinatorial principle of modality
with primitive identity of properties (‘quiddities’). It just needs to be pointed out
that for Lewis the epistemological predicament of Ramseyan humility arises from
the possibility that our final theories are in a sense multiply realisable. Cei and
French explicitly acknowledge this, and it raises the question why they take this
sort of epistemic humility to be a potential way of capturing Worrall’s ‘hidden
natures’. For it is evident that Worrall (1989) is purely concerned with the anti-
realist argument from the history of radical theory-shifts, and not at all with the
(rather idealised) notion of ‘final theory’. Indeed, according to Worrall the ether
theory of Fresnel’s, for example, would describe the nature of light (were it true).
So surely the final theory would not leave any nature (in Worrall’s sense) hidden,
if we were justified in taking the theory to be true! So why do Cei and French
read Worrall this way? Perhaps it is partly due to Worrall’s appeal to Poincare´,
and Poincare´’s appeal to Kant.1 But it needs pointing out that Worrall merely
uses Poincare´’s writings as a heuristic spring board to ESR, wholly disregarding
his neo-Kantianism. Another source of motivation for Cei and French may be
the fact both Lewis and Worrall (2001) appeal to Ramsey sentences as a way to
capture structure-as-opposed-to-nature. But, horses for courses: Ramsey sentence
is simply a piece of logical machinery that can be used for many philosophical
purposes, and Lewis’s purposes are far removed from Worrall’s.
The motivation that Cei and French try to gather for OSR from their reading
of ‘hidden natures’ fails. It is much more natural to attribute to ESR the following
sense of epistemic humility. Our successful theories have often radically changed,
so we are not in a position to commit to the full truth of our present theories. Rather,
we should commit to our present theories being partially true in some ‘structural’
sense. With a suitable nature–structure distinction at hand we can say that our
present theories, whether final or not, describe the structure of the world correctly,
1Lewis’s Ramseyan humility is inspired by Rae Langton’s (1998) interpretation of Kant.
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but not its nature. Our theories describe various properties of the worldly fur-
niture and processes, and these properties describe a possible way the nature of
these things could be. But we do not know that our world is a world of that kind.
What we do know, however, is that the structure of our world—whatever its nature
is—is such that it is correctly described by our theories. This sense of epistemic
humility straightforwardly relates to the problem that allegedly ‘inductively’ rises
from the history of science: most our current theories are probably not final ones—
something that is also supported by the grand difficulties in making our theories fit
together—and even if one of our theories is a final theory (for its domain) in some
sense, we are simply not in a position to claim that we know that.
I take ESR to be a well-motivated, somewhat programmatic realist alternative.
The advocates of OSR take this as their starting point, and then offer two distinc-
tive sources of motivation for going beyond ESR. One turns on a particular kind
of underdetermination arguably exhibited by some of our best theories, seriously
impeding any substantial proclamation of realist commitments. The other source
of inspiration comes from witnessing certain structuralist themes in the philosophy
of physics, and develops into an argument by adopting a particular perspective on
the relationship between metaphysics and epistemology. These two motivations
for OSR are scrutinised in the next two sections.
3 Metaphysical Underdetermination
James Ladyman asked about structural realism: ‘is it metaphysics or epistemol-
ogy?’ (1998: 410) As explicated above the answer seems clear: it is epistemology.
There is, however, an interesting argument that at first seems to lead to a different
conclusion.
3.1 The argument
Consider the challenge of providing a realist interpretation of quantum mechanics.
Setting aside the problems with the collapse of the wave function to begin with,
the realist should say of this most successful mature theory that it is probably ap-
proximately true in its claims about the unobservable world. So quantum particles,
for example, are approximately like the theory tells us they are. But what does the
theory tell us, exactly? Statistical behaviour of particles has been taken to be the
key to their metaphysical nature. The behaviour of an assemblange of quantum
particles is correctly described by either Bose–Einstein or Fermi-Dirac statistics,
whilst Maxwell-Boltzmann statistics describes the behaviour of classical particles.
What accounts for these differences in statistics?
According to our best understanding of quantum theory these particles can just
as well be individuals (‘cheese’) or non-individuals (‘chalk’), this metaphysical
nature of the quantum objects being underdetermined by the theory. Both interpre-
tations of the physics are equally compatible with the phenomena as well as the
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formalism. (French 1989, 1998; Huggett 1997; French and Rickles 2003; French
& Krause 2006) So the realist is arguably in a pickle: she wants to say that the
nature of quantum particles is as the theory says it is, but the theory doesn’t say
what it is!
We need to recognise the failure of our best theories to determine even
the most fundamental ontological characteristic of the purported enti-
ties they feature. It is an ersatz form of realism that recommends be-
lief in the existence of entities that have such ambiguous metaphysical
status. What is required is a shift to a different ontological basis al-
together, one for which questions of individuality simply do not arise.
(Ladyman, 1998: 419–420)
I will now try to unpack this argument, assuming that there indeed is such meta-
physical underdetermination at least with respect to some entities featured in our
best physical theories.2 We can then focus on the question of how the realist should
react. Also, I follow Ladyman & French in taking standard realism to have the fol-
lowing metaphysical dimension: the ability to spell out our realist commitments in
terms of objects, or entities, that exist.3 I do not take such metaphysical dimension
to be a well-motivated part of realism. What I aim to show after explicating the
argument from metaphysical underdetermination is that the move from standard
realism to ontic structural realism is unnecessarily radical and not supported by the
premise of metaphysical underdetermination. That is, it is natural to respond to the
challenge by reducing the metaphysical dimension of standard realism, instead of
adopting a radically alternative structuralist ontology.
But first, let’s clarify the challenge itself: what is metaphysical underdetermi-
nation? For one thing, it is clearly different from the standard underdetermination
objection to realism, according to which the realist cannot justify her commitment
to any theoretical proposition P since there is always an empirically equivalent in-
compatible theory which says P † (incompatible with P ). It is the rampant nature of
this kind of underdetermination that (allegedly) makes it such a serious objection.
If underdetermination was more limited in scope, so that only some theoretical
propositions had empirically equivalent competitors, then realism about those parts
of theories that are not thus underdetermined would be an option, at least prima
facie. (Psillos, 1999: 167) Metaphysical underdetermination is different from em-
pirical underdetermination by virtue of not being rampant. Rather, the former has
a very limited scope: it is only the metaphysical nature of quantum particles (and
whatever else leads to a similar predicament) that is underdetermined. So, prima
2Ladyman (1998), French & Ladyman (2003) and French & Rickles (2003) defend this premise
particularly for quantum particles and quantum fields, and tentatively point towards the nature of
spacetime. Pooley (2006) dissents, especially regarding the underdetermined status of spacetime
points. See also Redhead & Teller (1992) and Saunders (2003b) for criticism of the underdetermina-
tion thesis, and French & Krause (2006) for further defence.
3Psillos (1999), for example, represents standard realism thus characterised for Ladyman &
French. French (2006) has called this ‘object oriented’ realism.
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facie, we should consider placing realist commitments to the common denomina-
tor, to whatever is common to both individuals-based and non-individuals-based
interpretations of quantum physics, say.
But this strategy, the argument continues, is at a risk of leading to mere ‘ersatz’
realism. The worry is that in order to spell out one’s realist commitments one needs
to appeal to metaphysical natures. This follows directly from the metaphysical
dimension of standard realism: to say that such-and-such entities exist requires
that one spells out what an entity is. So, for example, if one says that ‘According
to QED there exist spin-half particles with charge e’, one implicitly appeals to
a metaphysical imagery (extrapolated from our experience of the macroworld) of
point-like objects with properties mass, spin, etc., to give cognitive content to one’s
assertion. Assertions
(S) There are spin-half particles with charge e and other properties as described
by QED.
(S’) There are hard elastic orange balls of the diameter of 24 centimeters, with a
black stripe contouring around the ball.
are read on a par according to standard realism: they both assert the existence of
some objects with some properties. Basketballs are observable, electrons are not,
but we have good reasons to believe in the existence of both. So far so good. But
the ontic structuralist points out that our epistemic grasp of the very objecthood of
electrons, according to the argument from metaphysical underdetermination, is on
a shaky ground. Therefore, S expresses no cognitive content beyond the surface
semantic analogy which only pays lip service to the curious symmetry properties
of the mathematical representation of quantum particles.
Hence, there is an acute problem with theoretical posits the metaphysical na-
ture of which is underdetermined by the physics.4 The challenge is that the content
of prototypical realist assertions regarding our knowledge of quarks and electrons,
say, is deflated unless the realist is able to specify ‘the most fundamental meta-
physical categories’ exemplified by the referents of ‘quark’ and ‘electron’. The
standard realist, not willing to tackle these subtle issues posed by the foundations
of physics, is merely offering a cheap simulacrum of knowledge of the quantum
world, based on an extraneous metaphysical image given in terms of categories
4The emphasis on theoretical posits is crucial here, as becomes clear by considering the following
criticism of the above argument. Chakravartty (2003) has questioned the ramifications of the meta-
physical underdetermination of individuality versus non-individuality by comparing it to the kind of
underdetermination we face at the level of everyday objects: are tables and chairs ultimately just
bundles of properties, or are they substances instantiating universals? French & Ladyman (2003,
p. 51) insist that the two cases differ since ‘in the case of unobservables the content of belief in them
is exhausted by their theoretical description—if that underdetermines their metaphysical nature then
our belief is empty’. In my view there is a difference between the two cases, but I would also insist
that agnosticism about the metaphysical natures of electrons, say, does not render realist commit-
ments empty. There is much common ground to the alternative metaphysical pictures, which can be
captured in terms of properties attributed to electrons.
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derived from our experience of the macroworld. Such realism is ‘ersatz’ in that
it does not succeed in capturing any actual realist commitment regarding our best
theories. What allegedly could save the realist, however, is ontological commit-
ment to structure (as opposed to (non-)individual objects with properties) as the
fundamental metaphysical category.
3.2 Resisting the argument
There are several points to be made in response to the above argument. (A) The
common denominator -strategy of restricting the realist commitments to the shared
parts of the underdetermined interpretations works. What is required is a move
away from entities to properties in spelling out theoretical commitments. Labelling
standard realism ‘ersatz’ may be appropriate in exposing the superfluousness of
certain level of its implicit metaphysical commitments. But moving directly from
standard (or ‘object oriented’) realism to structural realism is non sequitur. (B) To
make sense of the impact of quantum mechanics in realist terms we do not need to
defend realism about the metaphysical nature of quantum particles, say. (C) There
is something fishy about the idea of avoiding metaphysical underdetermination by
promising to provide yet another metaphysical framework of structures primitively
understood.
A. If the standard realist is unable to choose between the metaphysically under-
determined options, are her realist commitments really as empty as the charge of
ersatzism suggests? Is ontological structuralism a natural solution to her alleged
predicament?
French and Ladyman press the standard realist on the nature of quantum parti-
cles:
[T]he (standard) realist is unable to give a full answer to [the ques-
tion:]‘what is a quantum object?’, where a ‘full’ answer will involve
the metaphysical nature explicated in terms of such fundamental cate-
gories as individuality, identity, etc. Van Fraassen rightly sees this as a
challenge to standard realism (and it is regrettable that the standard re-
alist has not seen fit to respond) expressing his conclusion as a waving
‘good-bye to metaphysics’X (1991, 480–482), leaving the field clear
for constructive empiricism. (2003: 36, my italics)
So realism without adequate metaphysics succumbs to anti-realism. But perhaps
to demand a full answer is to demand too much. Van Fraassen (as I read him)
sees the kind of metaphysical underdetermination at issue to set a challenge for
full-blown metaphysics, not realism per se. Underdetermination considerations in
general do motivate van Fraassen’s empiricism, for sure, but various degrees of
epistemic confidence about the results of our inductive practices can be had whilst
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sharing some of van Fraassen’s distaste for wholesale metaphysics.5
Nevertheless, French & Ladyman insist (in a footnote marked by X in the above
quote) that ‘if the realist refuses to be drawn on the metaphysics at least at the
level of individuality versus non-individuality then how are we supposed to make
sense of the impact of quantum mechanics?’ (ibid., 50) I will look at the impact
of quantum statistics below, but let’s first consider this challenge in the abstract.
There is an ambiguity here: there are two separate explanatory endeavours at stake
for the realist. How can she explain (E1) the success of the theory by its partial
truth; and (E2) what the world could be like to make the theory true simpliciter?
The latter challenge asks what the world could be like according to our theory read
literally, whilst the former asks what the world must be like according to our theory
in order for the success of science (and of that theory in particular) not to appear
‘miraculous’. Neither of these challenges is made insuperable by the metaphysical
underdetermination at hand.
Regarding (E2), the realist can simply take different metaphysical frameworks
to paint different meaningful images of how the world could be. Whether we have
(ever could have) grounds to choose between such images—the very possibility
and limits of metaphysical knowledge—is a different question, of course.6 Re-
garding (E1), the realist’s response depends on her general characterisation of her
realist commitments. What does it take to philosophically explain the success of
a scientific theory in the spirit of scientific realism? How is the truth-tracking
theoretical content that is doing the explaining to be delineated in the first place?
Such questions surface in the context of the debate around pessimistic induction,
and the realist—by virtue of not being ultra-optimistic about our current science—
tries avoid the force of the pessimistic historical record by appealing to some kind
partial truth. I have urged elsewhere that this notion should be analysed in terms
of theoretical properties responsible for successful derivations in science. (Saatsi,
2005) This conception of realist commitments is appropriate in the present con-
text, too, since knowledge of these success-fuelling properties can be independent
of having knowledge (or not) of the nature of reality in terms of the fundamental
metaphysical categories relevant to the explanandum (E2) above. (I will illustrate
this below with quantum statistics.)
It is unmotivated to label standard realism ersatz, with the implication that it
amounts to no more than ‘empty strutting and posturing’ (as van Fraassen put it)
unless salvaged by a novel metaphysical basis. In the face of recurrent theory-shifts
5Exactly how realism and metaphysics are related is a difficult question, of course. It is unde-
niable that some metaphysical assumptions play a role in scientific heuristics and decision-making,
and perhaps some are required to deal with a different kind of underdetermination (Jones, 1991 vs.
McMullin, 1992). I don’t want to belittle these issues, but it is justified to bracket them here in order
to focus purely on the argument from metaphysical underdetermination.
6Some argue that the realist is committed to optimism about the possibility metaphysics by virtue
of strongly appealing to the inference to the best explanation, for example. (Hawley, 2006) I find
these arguments problematic, but this doesn’t matter here. What matters is that there is a further
issue as to what extent realism and metaphysics are connected. And further issues need further
arguments.
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the realist has qualified her commitments to the partial truth of our current theories.
She also resolutely holds onto her basic argument for realism, the no miracles ar-
guments. In the explanatory spirit of this argument the realist claims that theories’
partial truth, suitably construed, is the best explanation for their success. I think we
should construe a theory’s partial truth as a matter of getting the (derivationally)
crucial theoretical properties right. This construal is fit for the explanatory task, as
far as certain historical case-studies are concerned. (Saatsi, 2005) This property-
centered (as opposed to object-centered) notion of partial truth can function sim-
ilarly here. We can answer the question (E1) without taking a stance regarding
the metaphysically underdetermined alternatives because the relevant explanatory,
success-fuelling properties are shared by the competing metaphysical interpreta-
tions. We need to reject the intuition that the realist must engage in metaphysics to
the extent that she can spell out her commitments in terms of fundamental meta-
physical categories. So let’s wave good-bye to standard realism, and welcome a
metaphysically-less-inflated-realism, which I just call ‘realism’ from now on.
B. What, then, can a realist claim to know of quantum particles? How can these
realist commitments be spelled out without reference to fundamental metaphysical
categories? Consider, to begin with, a feasible metaphysical underdetermination
vis-a`-vis the nature of spacetime. The realist wants to explain the success of the
general theory of relativity by claiming it to have correctly identified the curvature
of spacetime as the source of gravitational phenomena. Explaining the success-
ful accommodation of the precession of the Mercury perihelion in these terms is
independent of the metaphysical question of whether the spacetime points of the
substantivalist interpretation of GTR are to be understood haecceitistically or anti-
haecceitistically.7 In both of these metaphysical pictures the theory is true about
the crucial unobservable features of the world, so that the concepts of curvature
and geodesic, for example, similarly apply to properties of substantival spacetime.
This kind of metaphysical underdetermination is quite different from the more old-
fashioned empirical underdetermination that can take place in the spacetime con-
text: one theory having a curved spacetime and the other having extra forces in its
ontology. In the face of such underdetermination we really may not know what to
believe in. Not so in the case of metaphysical underdetermination: we just believe
that the theory correctly describes how spacetime is curved.
This case illustrates how metaphysical underdetermination can fall outside of
natural realist commitments. But there is a crucial disanalogy to the case of quan-
tum statistics: the underdetermined alternatives in the spacetime case—haecceitism
and anti-haecceitism with respect to spacetime points—concern the modal identity
of spacetime points, not their individuality. (Pooley, 2006) Nevertheless, the lesson
7The realist explanation of this success actually is independent of the existence or otherwise
of spacetime points altogether, as corresponding to points of the mathematical manifold of a GTR
model. The realist can remain agnostic of the ‘fine-structure’ of spacetime at the Planck-scale, only
maintaining that the coarse-grained macrofeatures that emerge from the ultimate quantum theory of
gravity are correctly described by GTR.
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generalises. We can account for the the success of quantum statistics without refer-
ence to the metaphysical nature of particles. The explanation is subtle, and I refer
to Saunders (2006) for details. The gist of the explanation turns on the probability
measure on quantum state space: the discreteness of this measure makes a crucial
difference in how the states are counted under permutation symmetry. Saunders
demonstrates how the difference between classical and quantum statistics arises
from the fact that the probability measure is continuous for classical state space,
whilst being discrete for quantum state space, even if both classical and quantum
particles are assumed to be indistinguishable and permutation symmetry is applica-
ble to both. (Permuting indistinguishable particles under permutation symmetry is
taken to yield the very same state.) The realist does not have to deny that there may
be different metaphysical explanations, underdetermined by the physics, for this
crucial difference between classical and quantum systems. But these metaphysical
musings go beyond what is required by the realist to explain ‘the impact of quantum
mechanics’, as far as the explananda (E1) is concerned. Regarding this aspect of
quantum mechanics, the realist is committed to the delineative discreteness of the
quantum world—a property of quantum systems. Although this undeniably only
scratches the surface of what the realist needs to say about quantum mechanics, it
does address the source of the argument from metaphysical underdetermination.
C. Let’s return to the two explananda (E1) and (E2), above. It seems that even at
the level of (E2) the underdetermination does not motivate the radical step to OSR,
regarded as ‘offering a reconceptualisation of ontology, at the most basic meta-
physical level, which effects a shift from objects to structures’ (ibid., 37). Such a
metaphysical project is in itself fully legitimate, of course, but cannot in my view
gain any extra impetus from the metaphysical underdetermination. An ontological
structuralist conclusion (regarding (E2)) could perhaps be be argued for by saying
that structuralist metaphysics provides the only way to make sense of the notion of
objecthood at the level of quantum particles. (Saunders 2003a, 2003b)8 But this
is not the claim presently evaluated! Indeed, such a claim directly contradicts the
underdetermination premise which is conditional on both horns being intelligible
bona fide possibilities. If anything, it seems that the structuralist proposal only
makes matters worse, for with such an alternative structuralist ontology available
there would be three instead of two to choose from!9 The choice between these
would presumably be done on the grounds of general metaphysical preferences.
This, indeed, is another difference between metaphysical and empirical underde-
termination; if one (pace van Fraassen) is optimistic about metaphysical reasoning
in general, then arguably metaphysical underdetermination can be broken by con-
8Ladyman and Ross (2007) perhaps also argue for this claim, having shifted away from the argu-
ment from metaphysical underdetermination.
9It has been suggested that the individuals and non-individuals packages could be viewed as
different representations of the common ‘structuralist core’ but this intuition must be substantiated
in order to show how the underdetermined options go over and above the common core, instead of
just being metaphysical alternatives.
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siderations that go beyond physics and belong to philosophy simpliciter.
* * *
I conclude that the motivation gained from the metaphysical underdetermina-
tion for structural realism, and for ontological structural realism in particular, is
highly problematic. I will next briefly look at an oblique line of enquiry that is
sometimes taken to provide further grounds for OSR, or even for taking OSR to
supplant ESR.
4 Structuralism in Philosophy of Physics
I now want to argue in more general terms for a distinction to be made between
two levels of structuralist philosophy often run together in a synergistic fashion.10
One family of structuralist thought belongs to the philosophy of physics proper:
the unifying theme is the conviction that the ontology of physics is best conceived
in structural terms. This line of thought is well represented in the history of philos-
ophy by the likes of Cassirer and Eddington, for example, as a way of philosoph-
ically refining the worldviews imposed upon us by quantum mechanics and the
general theory of relativity. (French 2003, French & Rickles 2006, Ryckman 2004)
Very broadly speaking this movement can be characterised as an attempt to shift
one’s ontology away from objects, as traditionally conceived, and towards struc-
tures relationally understood. The historical as well as the contemporary literature
on this line of thought is by and large spurred on by the central role of fundamental
symmetries exhibited by our best physical theories: the diffeomorphism invariance
of the general theory of relativity, permutation symmetries in quantum mechan-
ics, gauge symmetries of gauge field theories, and so on. Very crudely put, these
symmetries can in a sense be understood to ‘relationally define’, or ‘constitute’ the
objects that are invariant under these symmetries, and hence the symmetries are
ontologically prior to the objects in some sense.
A different set of structuralist ideas belongs to epistemology, and concern the
question of what we can claim to know of the (mind independent) world. Again,
there are eminent historical figures to draw on, such as Russell (1927) fighting
against phenomenalism about the external world. But in the contemporary context
the epistemological motivation, as outlined in section 2, boils down to something
quite specific. It is the attempt to craft a plausible image of science, motivated by
the intuition behind the No-Miracles Argument and not refuted by the history of
science. Once again, the idea simply is, crudely put, that theories by and large get
the ‘structure’ right but may well say falsehoods about the rest.
10It is not always easy to prise apart the different motivations running in parallel, but in my view
an illegitimately close connection between different structuralist motivations is implied in Lady-
man (1998), French & Ladyman (2003), Saunders (2003b), Lyre (2004), and French & Rickles
(2006), for example.
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On the face of it, it is not easy to say exactly how structuralism in the phi-
losophy of physics should interact with this epistemological idea. One might at
first think that if the preferred ontology of physics is structural—so that one is an
ontological structural realist at the level of philosophy of physics—then one must
also be a structuralist with respect to one’s epistemological scientific image, since
all theoretical truths are ultimately truths about structure. But the connection isn’t
this straightforward. After all, the structuralist ontology is inspired by metaphys-
ical questions regarding a literal reading of our best theories—questions such as:
what are the spacetime points quantified over in GTR like; how to understand the
nature of quantum particles in the face of the permutation symmetry, or the gauge
symmetry behind the Bohm-Aharonov effect. The epistemological humility of the
realist image, on the other hand, is based on the belief that our theories may only
be partially true. Therefore the notion of partial truth adopted by the realist can
affect whether or not a literal reading of our present theories has input on the real-
ist’s epistemic commitments. For example, it might be part of the realist image that
there really is a curved spacetime and that free particles move along the shortest
paths as mathematically represented by geodesics on a manifold—i.e. the theo-
retical terms ‘curvature of spacetime’ and ‘shortest path’ do refer—irrespective
of whether the most fundamental spacetime ontology consists of dimensionless
points or of something else completely. GTR might be a true representation of
the curvature properties of spacetime whilst being a false representation of its ‘fine
structure’. Indeed, being a classical (non-quantised) theory this is most probably
the case, as acknowledged by an epistemically cautious realist. Whether or not
there is an argument for interpreting GTR substantivalism in structuralist terms, it
is not clear what ramifications this argument should have on such a realist.
This example is enough to sever intimate link between ontological and epis-
temological structuralism. Structuralism in metaphysics might be appropriate for
an interpretation of some theory T , but if the realist is only committed to T be-
ing partially true it is not clear what epistemological lessons we should draw from
the metaphysics. The realist only needs the resources required to capture those
aspects of the world that were latched onto by the scientific practice in producing
the successes of TS . I believe that those features can be described independently
of the underlying ‘fundamental metaphysical categories’. Strangely enough, Lady-
man and French also repeatedly stress that the preferred ontology cannot be drawn
directly from the physics: ‘we cannot infer the appropriate metaphysics for de-
scribing the world from the physics itself.’ (da Costa & French 2003: 188)11 So
what becomes of the idea that the realist needs to be a structural realist in order to
latch onto the world as described in physics?
I have been critical of the idea that taking into account the metaphysical conun-
drums of modern physics leads to structural scientific realism. There is another,
11They underscore this in connection of the metaphysical underdetermination, of course, to mo-
tivate the alternative structuralist ontology. As far as I can see, the alluded to ontological notion of
structure forms just another fundamental metaphysical category.
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stronger idea that also ought to be dismissed. This line of thought urges that a
structuralist ontology at the level of physics does not only motivate structural re-
alism, but surpasses the arguments for ESR altogether. Lyre (2004), for example,
writes in connection of gauge symmetries:
[A] philosophical view such as structural realism gains by far more
credence if supported by arguments from science directly than by mere
indirect and notoriously debatable considerations of the philosophy
of science. This is the difference in style between the Worrall-type
of arguments in favor of structural realism and the French-type of
arguments—on the basis of the ontology of quantum theory—or the
Stachel-type—on the basis of general relativity. (Lyre 2004: 621)
But this seems a grand non sequitur: epistemic structuralist a` la Worrall (1989), for
example, would not consider one or another interpretation of the literal reading of
quantum mechanics to be of significance to his realism, since he is only committed
to the claim that (a) the relevant theoretical structure suitably approximates the
structure of any future theory of quantum phenomena, and (b) we can ultimately
make sense of the success of quantum theory in terms of ESR.
The failure to properly distinguish between the ontological and epistemological
levels of structuralist endeavour has landed the realism discussion in this context
in a muddle. Lyre, for example, takes structural realism to be a monolithic po-
sition supported by arguments from both philosophy of physics and philosophy
of science. These two sets of arguments simply do not have the same objective.
One can quite consistently advocate a structuralist ontology vis-a`-vis some feature
of physics, and maintain ESR or some other realist position with respect to one’s
epistemological stance.
5 Conclusion
Several considerations for various forms of structural realism have been recently
advanced in the quickly burgeoning literature. There is growing need to draw crit-
ical distinctions in order to regiment the multifaceted debate: too often different
senses of ‘structure’ and ‘structuralism’ are confusingly placed under one and the
same heading. Here I have attempted to make some headway with this clarificatory
task, by focusing on different motivations for adopting a form of structural realism.
If correctly interpreted, the original epistemic strand of structural realism is a well
motivated, if still somewhat programmatic position. What has been hailed by some
as the radical alternative—the ontic version of structural realims—is rather weakly
motivated in comparison. Whilst there is most certainly room for various forms of
structuralism in metaphysics and philosophy of physics, the links between the var-
ious considerations are most subtle than is currently aknowledged in the literature.
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